Introduction
Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that there are two main types of public intervention in broadband Internet access markets: those related to market power (regulation and competition policy) and those related to positive externalities (network externalities or impact on overall economic growth). The first of these two types of intervention is carried out in the United States by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and by the states, and in the European Union by the European Commission and the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) of the member states. The third package of European directives on telecommunications created the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), a pan-European telecommunications regulator based on the coordination of NRAs. Policies related to the promotion of broadband through different combinations of subsidies and public investments ("industrial policies") are mainly carried out at decentralized levels both in the US 1 and in Europe. This is in contrast with countries that have achieved very high levels of broadband deployment, such as South Korea and Japan, which have promoted strong national policies to promote broadband penetration for many years (see Trillas, 2008a) .
In this paper, we present both a theoretical model and an empirical estimation to analyse the interaction of regulation, industrial policy and jurisdictional allocation, and their impact on broadband deployment. Although central powers may be more focused, internalize the relevant territorial externalities and have a more balanced matching of instruments and objectives, decentralized powers -lacking regulatory specializationmay internalize local horizontal policy spillovers (such as the promotion of e-health and e-learning) and use a diversity of objectives as a commitment device in the presence of sunk investments. A significant part of the investments needed to deploy broadband is highly specific (for example, underground optical fibre) and its value for alternative uses is very low or close to zero. This commitment by local authorities may be reflected in a variety of policies, for instance, local powers may have incentives to help alleviate the collective action problem of the joint use of rights of way and other physical infrastructures. 2 This enhanced commitment, similar to that mentioned by Weingast (1995) in the so-called theory of market-preserving federalism, may counter-balance the temptation of local powers to make expropriating or confiscatory demands when managing the rights of way (see among others Troesken, 1996, and Neufeld, 2008,) .
The analysis of how policy intervention is organized in the vertical structure of government matters for historical, technological and political reasons. The history of network industries, including telecommunications, shows an evolution from an essentially local industry 3 to an increasingly larger geographic market size that ran parallel to the increasing role of the state and federal levels (see Trillas, 2008b) . Modern physical networks in telecommunications exhibit increasing returns to scale but require local rights of way. At the beginning of the twenty-first century all levels of government are active (through regulation, competition policy or "industrial policy") in the broadband sector. The degree and nature of the involvement of each level of government are of great importance to telecommunications firms, which have lobbied exhaustively for the approval of the third package of European directives on telecommunications with the argument that increased regulatory harmonization and market integration will reduce the costs of European wide operators.
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to provide insights into the impact of policy centralization or decentralization on broadband penetration. For this purpose we first develop a theoretical framework to show the existing trade-off between the different spillovers internalized by each level of government: the central government (centralization) internalizes territorial spillovers while regional/local governments (decentralization) internalize policy spillovers. As a result, the empirical prediction of our model is that the impact of decentralization on network extension is ambiguous. In the empirical exercise, using data for OCDE and EU countries for the period 1999-2006, we examine whether centralization is necessary to promote new 2 Local powers have a choice of either charging a high price (in monetary or other terms) for the use of rights of way or expediting procedures and minimizing the transaction and disruption costs of digging streets and of other collective infrastructures. Moreover, rights of way were the policy instrument that inaugurated regulation at the local level in the nineteenth century and it remains crucial in the telecommunication sector. 3 Historically there has been a trend to move regulation up the vertical structure of government. Troesken (1996) analyzes the transition from local to state regulation in the US gas industry. Electricity and telecommunications also started being regulated at the local level but at the beginning of the 20 th century it was moved to the state level. Yet there are still many instances of local intervention, and regulation is still mainly carried out at the state level, despite the creation of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1934 in the US and the increasing role played by the European Commission (EC) since the late 20 th century.
telecommunications markets, in particular the broadband access market. The existing literature, in the main, claims it is, but we find no support for this claim in our data. Our results show that indicators of national industrial policy are a weakly positive determinant of broadband deployment and that different measures of centralization are either irrelevant or have a negative impact on broadband deployment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the two branches of the existing research to which this paper refers: the literature on the economics of federalism and the empirical literature on the determinants of broadband penetration.
Section 3 presents the theoretical framework. Section 4 contains the econometric model specification, the data set and the empirical results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Literature review

The economics of federalism and network industries
The main arguments presented in the literature examining the economics of federalism are also applicable to network industries, as argued by Trillas (2008b) . 4 The Tiebout (1956) argument that jurisdictional competition may, under factor mobility and certain other conditions, select optimally differentiated policies was strengthened and applied to commitment for private investment by the market-preserving theory of Weingast (1995) . Treisman (2007) provides casual evidence that infrastructures devoted to public utilities or local airports have been used by local authorities to compete for mobile capital. However, regulatory competition may also unleash undesirable phenomena such as "race to the bottom" or "beggar thy neighbour" policies; an example of the latter in the telecommunication sector is high termination rates for calls originating from other countries. Nevertheless, laboratory federalism and tailoring arguments can also be used to defend a role for local powers, although interjurisdictional externalities, coordination and scale (at the product or administrative level) could tilt the balance in favour of central powers.
Although geographic market definition, in the sense with which it is employed in competition policy, could in theory be used as a criterion to choose the optimal regulatory jurisdiction, the fact is that often market boundaries do not coincide with those of political jurisdictions. Under certain specific conditions, it is worth going beyond traditional political boundaries and organizing regulation by special districts, 4 The pros and cons of decentralization in competition policy are discussed in Budzinski (2006) . such as the PJM regional transmission organization 5 or the NordPool wholesale market 6 in the case of electricity.
Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) argue that in the absence of significant interjurisdictional externalities, the allocation of policies should depend not only on efficiency criteria, but also on the objective of promoting political participation. This would justify local policies (that do not necessarily promote economic efficiency) if they are approved with sufficient levels of participation and transparency. In the energy (gas and electricity) sector, Troesken (1996) and Neufeld (2008) argue that a key factor in moving regulation from the local to the state level was the inability of local powers to commit to acceptable rates of return for private investors. In particular, Neufeld (2008) shows that for US electricity regulation, quasi-rents due to specific investments were a more important determinant than monopoly rents in the decision to move from local to state regulation. 7 Nonnenmacher (2001), however, argues that in the diffusion of the state regulation of the telegraph industry a cycle characterized by promotion followed by regulation was more important than quasi-rents considerations. Troesken (1996) , in the sense that there is a risk that local powers might hold up private operators, and stresses that this is particularly true when these operators are earning rents at the national level. In this case, the risk of hold-ups at the local level imposes a negative externality on the rest of the country. Brennan (2001) , however, stresses that in matters of local access the relevant markets are local, not national: "The issue at hand is not agreeing to a standard Internet protocol, but one of the structure of the local ISP market. Local officials presumably are both closer to the affected consumers and more knowledgeable regarding relevant market conditions than is the federal government. To the extent that the policy is based on alleviating problems created by monopolies in relevant markets, the policy choice and the risk of error should be a local prerogative, unless a wrong local choice will substantially reduce the value of Internet access elsewhere in the country." Table 1 organizes the literature summarised up to this juncture in three dimensions.
First generation arguments include those made before the emergence of contract theory.
The arguments in italics are concerned with the structural conditions of markets, which have the virtue of providing a clearer guide than is provided by other arguments. It can also be seen from Table 1 that more recent arguments have tended to provide more ambiguous conclusions.
<INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE>
Empirics: decentralization and determinants of broadband penetration
From an empirical point of view, few studies, to the best of our knowledge, have analysed, as we do, the impact of the jurisdictional allocation of regulation in network industries. Humplick and Estache (1995) (distinguishing between platform-based or access-based) and the complementarity of goods.
Theoretical framework: A broadband investment model
We present a simple theoretical model of broadband investment to develop our intuitions on the impact of the centralization/decentralization of regulatory decisions on broadband deployment, and to provide a framework for the empirical estimations performed in the section that follows.
In broadband markets, consumption at adequate levels of quality depends on specific investments by operators. The incentives of these operators to invest, however, depend, among other factors, on a vector of policies: regulation, competition policy, control of rights of way needed to deploy lines, subsidies and taxes. With the so-called next generation networks, for example, connection speeds crucially depend on the number of fibre lines that reach households (fibre to the home); these fibre lines require expensive electronic equipment and also public works and access to buildings.
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In our simple model, in the centralized case there is internalization of the network externalities present in the telecommunication sector whereas in the decentralized case policy spillovers are internalized. For instance, when deciding on broadband policy, the government takes into account not only market power objectives, but also objectives in fields such as e-health and e-learning. Moreover, in the latter case we assume that this diversity of policy objectives can be used as a commitment device to facilitate high investment. That is, local decision makers may be concerned about total surplus in the regulated market as well as about local development, inflation, security of supply, the welfare of particular firms, input providers or groups of consumers. 12 To the extent that these objectives require high broadband investment, local government is able to commit itself not to expropriate investments. respectively. Moreover, we assume that no authority has commitment powers, so that investment is chosen by the firms before the (central or local) authority fixes the policy.
In this sense, it is an incomplete contracts model.
There is one central regulator that fixes
C i x as implementing a bargaining solution reached by firms and consumers where firms' ex-post surplus is α times that of consumers. Parameter α > 0 measures the weight of the welfare of shareholders in the 11 In 2006, Japan had 7.8 million of fibre to the home lines, whereas the core EU countries (the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands) had just 870.000 such lines. As a result, Japan had an average speed for downloading files of 63.6 megabits per second, whereas Spain, for example, had an average speed of 1.2 megabits per second. 12 It is not that central governments are unconcerned by these issues, but it is implicitly assumed that they have specific instruments to deal with them, for instance, central banks for dealing with monetary policy. central regulator's objective function relative to that of consumers (a measure of capture of the regulated industry or a measure of the bargaining power of telecommunications operators). If α = 1, consumers and shareholders have the same bargaining power. As for the parameter α, note that different central governments may differ in their scope for capture and in their commitment to policies. For example, casual evidence suggests that the central level is more "capturable" by businesses in the US than it is in Europe, and that the EU Commission has recently developed relatively more pro-consumer policies and, therefore, has been less able to commit. 13 In the US there is a quid pro quo between large firms and large political parties and, in recent decades, the Supreme Court has adopted a more pro-business stance (see the New York Times 03/16/2008). 14 In sum, the central decision makers care about consumer and producer surpluses in the broadband market, giving different weights to each, with these weights varying across central jurisdictions.
Local regulators care about their specific producers and consumers, as they do about various additional objectives (summarized by the variable Ω i ). Hence, each of the two decentralized jurisdictions chooses its policy with the objective of maximizing total surplus in the regulated industry plus various other objectives with a weight θ common across jurisdictions:
subject to a firm's participation constraint. The fact that θ > 0 at the local level but θ = 0 at the central level can be endogenized with a version of the Mulligan and Shleifer (2005) model of the political costs and benefits of specialized regulation.
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In this basic model, one firm in each jurisdiction decides, prior to governments fixing policy, an investment level (I i ) at a cost given by:
13 The reason might be that EU institutions are relatively new and still seek popular legitimacy. 14 Moreover, many companies have a national scope in the US and most companies do not, at least as yet, have a European scope, and there are no effective pan-European political parties; so the institutions of supply and demand for political action are absent or only seminal in Europe.
15 θ may also be interpreted as an inverse measure of the transaction costs of lobbying of interest groups other than consumers and shareholders (for example, the management of an incumbent firm that wants to maintain their position in case of a takeover). These transaction costs are assumed to be lower at the local level, because collective action problems are lower at this level, there is less policy specialization and the mandates of agencies are vaguer. As is sometimes said, at the local level all interested parties meet when they collect their children from the same school.
) (
This investment has an impact on the demand function or consumer valuation (e.g., upgrading the network allows people to subscribe to highly valued broadband services due to increased download speed). In a unit demand framework firms' profits are given
while consumer surplus in jurisdiction 1 is given by
indicates a parameter reflecting the inter-jurisdictional externalities. This parameter captures the idea that the network in one jurisdiction may be of higher value to consumers when the neighbouring jurisdiction has a better network. These spillovers are both direct and indirect. Direct externalities refer to individuals of jurisdiction 1 benefiting from a good network in the neighbouring jurisdiction, allowing them to contact more people, firms or organizations in this country. Indirect externalities refer to the individuals of jurisdiction 1 benefiting from a good network in the neighbouring jurisdiction by creating incentives for the development of enhanced applications which require a large market.
Once we have the basic model set-up, we can solve it for the two cases of jurisdictional allocation of regulation in network industries.
Case A: Central Regulation
The solution )) , ( ), , ( ( 
Therefore, under the simplifying assumption that central government policies across jurisdictions are uniform Eq. (5) can be rewritten as:
substituting this expression in Eq.(3), at the investment decision stage the firms maximize (assuming no discounting):
and from the first order condition of the firms' maximization problem we obtain: Ex-post, the regulatory authority maximizes Eq.
(1) for a given level of investment, i.e.
it maximizes:
For the comparison to be meaningful, local policies (
x ) and investment (I i ) must be related to profit and consumer surplus in the same way as in the central regulation case.
So given that the same weight is attributed to consumer surplus and profits at the local level, and given the unit demand 16 and the sunk nature of investments, the decentralized regulator actually sets policy to maximize its second objective or local policies, that can be defined as:
where we assume a specific functional form for the additional local policy objectives, x ) that may be 16 So deadweight loss plays no role in this basic analysis. 17 For instance, in Spain, it is quite common in some regions that the main shareholder in gas, water, highways and telecommunications is a large, influential non-profit savings bank that typically captures the deposits of a large proportion of that region's population and which is involved in social and cultural activities as a result of its foundational objectives. Examples include "La Caixa" in Catalonia and "Cajastur" in Asturias.
necessary for "other" local objectives including employment, local development, international influence, etc.
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Maximizing Eq. (10) taking into account Eq. (11) we obtain that the optimal regulatory policy in the decentralized case is:
given Eq. (12) the firm chooses investment to maximize its profits, that is, from Eq. 18 If a more intertemporal perspective is adopted, the fact that the second objective of local governments may change from time to time, because of global policies or the economic environment, introduces an additional level of volatility that may be absent at the central level owing to the more clearly focused objective function at this level. This would increase the costs of investment, reducing the relative attractiveness of the local regime. Which case dominates, therefore, remains as the empirical question that we address in the following section.
Empirical evidence: data and main results
Based on our review of the literature presented in section 2, and on the predictions derived from the theoretical model presented in section 3, we hypothesize that, in Tables 2 and 3 show the main results for OECD countries. More specifically, Table   2 presents the fixed effects panel estimations, while Table 3 takes into account possible problems of endogeneity in the panel estimations and presents the results using the instrumental variables (IV) approach.
<INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE>
In our empirical framework, it could be argued that some of the regressors used in estimating Eq. (16) might be endogenous to broadband penetration. For instance, GDP per capita, the regulatory variables or the measure of public policy used could also be affected by the broadband penetration rate. To avoid this problem we use lag variables of the potential endogenous variables as instruments in our panel data framework.
<INSERT FULL_UNBUND is positive and statistically significant, indicating that when full unbundling is mandatory there is higher broadband penetration as we would expect from a third-party access regulation of this type. The variable SUBLOOP is not statistically significant in the various models estimated.
The control variables that account for the demographics of each country have the expected signs and are in most cases statistically significant. The proxy for industrial policies (SUBSIDIES) is not statistically significant, although its t-ratio increases when we instrument it (see Table 3 ), and in all the estimations performed it presents a positive sign. The degree of centralization, measured as the share of central government revenue -our main variable of interest (%CENTRAL_REV) -presents a negative and statistically significant effect on broadband penetration in Table 2 , while its effect becomes statistically insignificant in Table 3 (albeit maintaining its negative sign). Thus, it would seem that centralization might negatively affect broadband penetration. As previously argued, however, our measure of centralization might be considered too general and, as such, be seen as being unrelated to broadband.
In line with Treisman (2007), we use a more specific variable to account for the centralization/decentralization of regulatory decisions in the broadband sector. In order to do this we restrict our estimations to countries within the European Union, for which we are able to use a decentralization variable that is specific to broadband policies: the centralization or otherwise of the control of rights of way, ROW1. This variable is the same as that used in Distaso et al. (2006) , but in our case we include observations for two more years. The estimations restricted to EU countries are presented in Table 4 (fixed effects panel estimation) and Table 5 (IV-fixed effects panel estimation).
Our results for the EU countries confirm those obtained for the whole sample of OECD countries. For the centralization variables, we obtain a negative and significant effect of %CENTRAL_REV, but a non significant effect for ROW1, rights of way and digging permits, although this variable presents a negative sign.
<INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE>
As for the centralization/decentralization issue, our results seem to suggest that the ability of local powers to solve the collective action problem of the joint use of physical broadband infrastructures, and the concern for negative externalities and social welfare, is of a greater weight than any short-term concern for maximizing confiscatory revenues and, hence, decentralization promotes investment in broadband.
<INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE>
Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a joint analysis of both regulatory and industrial policies and government jurisdictional allocation as they affect the penetration of broadband Internet access. We constructed a theoretical model to develop intuitions regarding the effect of centralization/decentralization on broadband investment. In the empirical exercise we examined whether centralization/decentralization is necessary to promote new telecommunications markets, in particular the broadband access market.
The existing literature, in the main, concludes it is, but we find no support for this claim in our data. More specifically, our results show that measures of centralization are either irrelevant or have a negative impact on broadband deployment. As such, our evidence is inconsistent with the opinions expressed by a number of scholars against decentralizing telecommunications policies.
Europe seems to be currently seeking to internalize its network externalities via a progressively more centralized regulation, whereas in the US geographical externalities are being internalized through large national (and, therefore, continental) firms that compete in a variety of product and geographic markets.
One could be tempted to argue that as some telecommunications markets become more and more inter-jurisdictional (and, hence, more and more global) in nature as a result of enhanced technology, market regulation and policy intervention should also cease to be local, regional and even national. However, long distance communications or backbone Internet networks are also potentially competitive in nature, much more so than local communications. The regulation of telecommunications is being increasingly relegated to matters of local access and bottlenecks are predominantly local. Here it is worth highlighting the differences with electricity markets, in which long distance transmission is a natural monopoly that has to be regulated at the highest possible level. 
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